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Abstract
Using newly panel data on visa restrictions for the years 2000 and 2010 in a 
theory-grounded gravity model, we find a robust, causal negative impact of visa 
restrictions on international tourist flows. By destination, the detrimental impact 
of this type of barrier is observed for tourists going to developing countries 
(with the exception of East and South Asia), but not for those to developed ones. 
By country of origin of tourists, the impact of visa restrictions appears to be 
the same for tourists coming from developed and developing countries. These 
findings have important consequences in policy terms for tourism management 
at a regional level.
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Resumen
Con datos bilaterales de visados de turismo para los años 2000 y 2010, median-
te un modelo de gravedad fundado en la teoría, observamos un efecto causal 
negativo de la existencia de políticas de visados restrictivas sobre los flujos inter-
nacionales de turistas. Por destinos, el efecto negativo de una política restrictiva 
de visados es importante para los turistas que visitan los países en desarrollo 
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(excepto los países de sudeste asiático) pero no para el resto de destinos. Por 
país de origen de los turistas, el impacto de las restricciones impuestas por la 
política de visados parece ser similar para los turistas que vienen tanto de los 
países desarrollados como de los países en desarrollo. Los resultados tienen 
importantes consecuencias en términos de gestión del turismo internacional.
Palabras clave: Turismo internacional, políticas de visado, panel de datos, 
ecuación de gravedad, países en desarrollo.
Códigos JEL: F10, F15.
1. Introduction
Many countries use visa restrictions as a mechanism to limit entry to unwel-
come travelers. The cost and hassle of obtaining a visa represent an important 
hurdle for many travelers, as it forces them to submit an application to the 
consular office of their intended destination, which can ask for processing fees, 
impose long waiting times, and possibly deny the visa with or without giving any 
reasons. This may explain that some travelers choose to change their destina-
tion elsewhere. Not surprisingly, tourist groups in several countries during the 
years of some of the most recent Olympic Games in the US, China and the UK 
complained about the tight restrictions on travel and visa requirements hitting 
the tourism industry hard, since many travelers decided to spend their holidays 
elsewhere (Song et al., 2012; Thomas, 2012; UK Visa Bureau, 2012).
While general opinion agrees that visa restrictions actually reduce the flow 
of people, it remains an empirical question to evaluate how much. Neumayer 
(2006) started by developing an ambitious database on bilateral visa restrictions 
in year 2004. His main focus was in understanding how states regulate human 
mobility across territories by employing visa restrictions. Building on this dataset, 
Neumayer (2010) found that countries with visa restrictions reduce on average 
the bilateral flow of tourists by around 60 percent.1 The novel feature of our 
approach lies in the use of a two-year panel data in order to introduce controls 
for country pair fixed effects when estimating the effect of visa restrictions on 
international tourism. For that purpose, we have constructed a new database of 
bilateral visa policies for the years 1999 and 2009 that will be used to estimate 
the determinants of bilateral tourist flows between 2000 and 2010. 
Most papers on the determinants of international tourist flows use either 
total number of arrivals to a country over a period of time (Zhang and Jensen, 
2007) or a pooled of annual origin-to-destination arrivals (Eilat and Einav, 2004; 
Gil-Pareja et al., 2008; Neumayer, 2010) as dependent variable. Baltagi et al. 
(2003) and Chen and Wall (2005) show that a standard gravity model of trade 
with cross-section of data or pooled data tends to be biased because of unob-
1 Using the same data, Neumayer (2011) and Bertoli & Fernández-Huertas (2012) found 
that countries with visa restrictions reduce on average the bilateral flow of exports and 
foreign direct investment by about 25 percent and the bilateral flow of immigrants by 
around 40 percent, respectively.
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served or incorrectly specified heterogeneity issues. In the context of flows of 
tourists and visa restrictions, such bias could arise if there were, e.g., historical 
reasons for a low level of any type of bilateral exchange, included travellers, as 
well as for low level of political and diplomatic relationship between the two 
countries. It might also be that the measures of physical or cultural distance used 
in standard gravity models were biased measures of distance-related transaction 
costs. If unobserved components of political, historical, cultural and geographical 
proximity positively affect visa policy and international travel, OLS estimates 
would suffer from endogeneity bias and overestimate the true effect of visa 
restrictions on international travel.
We include visa restrictions into a theory-grounded gravity equation. The 
data has a time dimension that we exploit in order to take into account un-
observed heterogeneity by differencing out unobserved country-pair specific 
characteristics. The advantages of this approach in the gravity context have 
been corroborated, among others, by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Head 
et al. (2010). Moreover, we are able to perform a regression-based test for strict 
exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002).
We report three major results. First, failing to control for observed time vari-
ant heterogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity indeed leads to overestimation. 
When the estimation control for country pair fixed effects, the OLS estimate 
of the coefficient of visa restriction falls by more than 60 percent (from 0.61 to 
0.23). Second, visa restrictions deter tourists going to developing countries, in 
particular to Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and Middle East, but not those 
going to developed countries. Finally, the detrimental impact of visa restrictions 
is similar for tourists from both developed and developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
estimation approach and outlines the data, while Section 3 discusses the empiri-
cal results. Section 4 finally concludes.
2. Methods
2.1. Econometric specification
A conventional fixed-effects gravity model estimating the link between 
NTAodt, the annual number of tourists (arrivals) from origin country o to des-
tination country d at time t, and VISAodt, a binary dummy variable that takes 
value of one if citizens from country o need a visa to visit country d at time t, 
might be presented as follows:
(1)  lnNTAodt = βVISAodt +γPROXod
' +γLINKSodt
' +τ ot +ϕdt +εodt
where the vector PROXod
'  collects time-invariant dyadic indicators of geogra-
phic and cultural proximity, which can influence bilateral travel costs; and the 
vector LINKSodt
'  collects time-variant dyadic measures of economic, political 
or historical links that stimulate the flow of people between countries, such as 
diplomatic representation, migrant networks or the intensity of trade relations. 
We include a comprehensive set of country-and-time effects τot and φdt to control 
for all origin and destination specific determinants, in particular for multilateral 
Estudios de Economía, Vol. 43 - Nº 2268
resistance terms. Finally we impose the error structure εodt =αod +uodt  where 
αod is a dyad-effect and uodt the usual idiosyncratic error term. In the presence of 
unobserved confounding factors, explanatory variables will be correlated with the 
error term uodt so that OLS is invalid. In order to control for αod we can proceed 
by estimating equation (1) including country pair dummies to eliminate αod. 
2.2. Data collection and analysis
Data for annual bilateral tourist arrivals (by country of origin and destina-
tion) are taken from the United Nations World Tourism Organization database 
(UNWTO, 2012b) and cover the years 2000 and 2010.2
TABLE 1
WORLD TOURIST ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES
Arrivals
in 2010
(millions)
 Share
(%)
Annual 
avg
growth 
rate
2000-
2010 (%)
Departures
in 2009
(millions)
 Share
(%)
Annual 
avg
growth 
rate
2000-2009 
(%)
WORLD 941.6 100 3.24 922.1 100 2.32
             
HIGH-INCOME 
COUNTRIES
558.6 59.3 1.72 532.2 57.7 1.00
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAs&Pac)
75.6 8.0 5.83 62.8 6.8 3.74
North America (N Am) 76.1 8.1 0.67 87.8 9.5 1.36
Western Europe (W Eur) 406.9 43.2 1.32 381.6 41.4 1.01
             
NO-HIGH INCOME 
COUNTRIES
383.0 40.7 6.15 409.0 44.4 7.33
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (EE&C As)
106.1 11.3 6.98 104.7 11.4 5.70
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAs&Pac)
117.8 12.5 6.31 na na na
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LA&CAR)
64.2 6.8 3.10 41.2 4.5 3.34
Middle East and Northern 
Africa (ME&N Af)
53.1 5.6 8.83 25.3 2.7 3.13
South Asia (S As) 9.4 1.0 6.68 20.1 2.2 10.41
Sub-Saharan Africa (S-SAf) 31.7 3.4 5.82 na na na
Source: Own elaboration using World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Note: “na” means not available. Data on departures are not yet available for year 2010 in WDI.
2 According to UNWTO, a visitor is a traveller taking a trip to a main destination outside her 
usual environment, for less than a year, for any main purpose other than to be employed 
by a resident entity in the country or place visited. A visitor is classified as a tourist (or 
overnight visitor), if the trip includes an overnight stay at the destination country (IRTS, 
2008). In this paper we employ data on international tourist arrivals taken from UNWTO 
database (2012). Unfortunately we are not being able to distinguish the purpose of the 
visit (leisure, business or personal).
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Table 1 describes the geographical pattern and recent evolution of the total 
number of arrivals and departures. In 2000 there were 681.1 million people 
traveling from one country to another; ten years later, the number was 941.6 
million, which implies an average annual growth around 3.2 percent. Whereas 
it is a positive trend, this rate shows a lower dynamism than that of international 
trade (5.1%) for the same period. In both cases, the so-called Great Recession 
(i.e., the current economic crisis which started in the summer of 2007 and had 
its main impact for 2008 and 2009) caused a serious slowdown in these inter-
national flows.
High income countries represented in 2010 almost 60 percent of the des-
tination of total international tourists, mostly concentrated in Western Europe 
(43 percent). However, on average the number of travelers grew at faster rate 
in non-high income countries- the exception being the high income countries 
in the East and Pacific region. The region with the highest annual growth rate 
of arrivals between 2000 and 2010 was Middle East and Northern Africa (8.8 
percent), followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia (6.9 percent). In con-
trast, arrivals to countries in North America only grew on average 0.6 percent 
per annum. Both the current distribution and the recent trend in the flows of 
people reflected in Table 1 are notoriously similar to those of international trade.
Information on bilateral visa policies is obtained from the Travel Information 
Manual, a monthly publication of the International Air Transport Association, 
IATA. We expand the Neumayer (2006) dataset, which refers to November 2004. 
Our data refers to September 1999 and September 2009, so we can track changes 
in visa restrictions over time. We built a dichotomous variable signaling whether 
the citizens of one country are requested to have a visa for entering into another 
country or they benefit from a visa waiver. Visas upon arrival are considered as 
visa waivers because they need not to be requested before traveling. The dataset 
contains 179 countries of destination and 188 countries of origin. Graphic 1 
offers a global landscape, grouped by main geographical areas, of visa restric-
tions and its evolution for the 2000-2010 period, both from the perspective of 
visa imposed to visitors to a particular region (Panel A) and from that of the 
number of countries which set visa to the citizens of that region (Panel B).3
The number of changes to visa restrictions is relatively small compared to 
the total number of restrictions in place. However, data show a unanimous trend 
towards the reduction of visa requirements, whatever the region considered4. 
This general pattern stands, for the average country in any area, both for the 
3 Our “visa restrictions” takes only two values: 1 if required visa and 0 if no visa, eVisa or 
visa on arrival. It would be desirable to collect more information about visas in order to 
construct a measure of “requirements intensity”. We are not aware of any individual or 
organisation that has elaborated a database with such detailed information.
4 Several examples proving this trend, among many others and coming from countries in 
different continents and with an uneven degree of development could be underlined: since 
2001, EU citizens except from the UK and Ireland are exempted from the visa requirement 
when travelling to Albania. Since 2007, Cambodia allows all foreign visitors to obtain a 
tourist visa upon arrival at the airport. Also since 2007, Philippines granted visa free to 
Indians nationals. Since 2008, Ecuador allows tourists from all countries but 10 to stay 
for up to 90 days without a visa on their arrival. However, that is not a unanimous trend, 
and there are cases of stricter visa policy. For example, in application of the Schengen 
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GRAPHIC 1
VISA RESTRICTIONS IN THE WORLD
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Source: Own calculations. Note on data interpretation: each value means that, on average, a par-
ticular region imposes visa restrictions on citizens coming for that number of countries 
(e.g.; for the world as a whole, the average diminishes by 8, i.e., from 133 in year 2000 to 
125 on year 2010).
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Source: Own calculations. Note on data interpretation: each value means that, on average, a citizen 
of a particular region suffers visa restrictions when traveling to that number of countries 
(e.g.; for the world as a whole, the average diminishes by 12, i.e., from 124 in year 2000 
to 112 on year 2010).
Examining the impact… / A. Artal-Tur, V. J. Pallardó-López, F. Requena-Silvente 271
number of restrictions imposed to foreign visitors and for the quantity of visas 
limiting that average country’s citizen freedom to travel abroad. 
Taking into account the countries where information is available for the 
2000-2010 period, the net reduction in the number of visa restrictions is slightly 
lower than 10 percent (from the initial level in 2000), and that trend towards a 
cut in this kind of barrier sped up between 2005 and 2010 with respect to the 
previous five-year period. A stronger path towards more flexibility appears 
among non-high income countries than among high income ones. The reduc-
tion in the average number of visa restrictions in the first set of countries tripled 
that in the rich countries. As a result, at the end of the period, the number of 
countries under visa requirements set by the average developed country (123) 
was essentially equal to the number of those affected by restrictions set by the 
average non-high income economy (124). 
On the other hand, the high income countries enjoyed a larger decrease in the 
number of visa imposed to their citizens, even if the reduction was also visible 
for less developed and emerging countries5. Indeed, in 2010, an average high 
income country’s citizen had to deal with less than half of visa restrictions than 
an average non-high income country’s one. 
Finally, reciprocity has been a common feature in the global process of cut-
ting the number of visa restrictions (i.e., a more liberal approach by a country 
with respect to travelers coming from another country is answered with a similar 
change by the partner), since about half of the total number of cuts are reciprocal. 
Data on income and population in 2000 and 2010 are taken from World Bank 
(2012). Time-invariant dyadic explanatory variable such as distance, contiguity, 
common language, colonial relationship and same continent are obtained from 
Head et al. (2010). We draw on several sources for the time-variant dyadic vari-
ables: the sum of bilateral migration stocks in 1990 and 2000 are from Ozden 
et al. (2011); the sum of bilateral trade flows in 1995 and 2005 are from Head 
et al. (2010) CEPII gravity database; the sum of the sending diplomatic contacts 
and receiving diplomatic contacts in 1995 and 2005 is obtained from Rahmet 
et al. (2010) Diplomatic Contacts (DIPCON) database; the common member-
ship in a economic integration agreement (EIA) in 1995 and 2005 is obtained 
from Baier and Bergstrand (2007).6 
Summary statistics of the variables are displayed in Appendix Table A.1, 
and a list of the countries of destination included in the analysis is displayed in 
Appendix Table A.2.
visa policy, Spain recently introduced a tourist visa to Colombia (2002), Ecuador (2004), 
Chile, Peru, Argentina and Bolivia (2007), and the rest of Latin America (2009).
5 The reduction in the number of visa requirements was distinctively intense for the Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia region, mainly as a result of the accession of several Eastern 
Europe countries to the European Union during this period. 
6 The web link for publicly available databases are: DIPCON database: http://www.u.arizona.
edu/~volgy; EIA database: http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty/fellows/bergstrand.shtml;WB-
GBM database: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database; 
CEPII gravity dataset: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
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3. Results 
Table 2 contains the estimation results. To start with, all the estimations 
include year-specific country dummies so we control for all possible observ-
able and unobservable country-specific characteristics. Column (1) replicates 
the preferred specification of Neumayer (2010) paper using data for the years 
2000 and 2010. The estimation excludes time-variant explanatory variables 
(LINKSodt
' ) in equation (1). All the time-invariant dyadic control variables 
(PROXod
' ) exhibit the expected sign and are statistically significant at conven-
tional levels. Geographical and cultural proximity demonstrate a very strong 
effect on international tourism. For example, pairs of countries that share a 
common border or speak the same language on average exhibit bilateral tour-
ist flows three times greater than pairs of countries that do not. Turning to the 
variable of interest, visa restrictions, the estimated coefficient suggest that the 
existence of a visa requirement reduces the bilateral flows of tourists by 55 
percent, close to impact that Neumayer (2010) found using data for travellers 
in year 2005 (between 60 and 63 percent).7
In the second column of Table 2 we introduce a vector of time-variant explana-
tory variables (LINKSodt
' ). The new variables measuring economic and political 
links exhibit the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The impact of diplomatic relations on international flows of tourists is 
positive: the presence of an embassy in the country of destination of visitors 
increases arrivals by 57 percent. In a similar way, if both countries are members 
of a regional economic agreement, arrivals increase by 13 percent. Moreover, the 
higher the intensity of exchanges of goods and migrants in the past, the larger 
the impact on international travel: bilateral travel flows increase by more than 1 
percent when either bilateral trade or bilateral migration increases by 10 percent.
In addition to their own explicative role, the inclusion of time-variant control 
variables, LINKSodt
' , have relevant implications on the estimated magnitude of 
the coefficients of the rest of variables, included our variable of interest. All 
the coefficients but one (the one of same region) are much smaller than those 
reported in Column (1). For example, the coefficient on distance falls by nearly 
half (from -1.44 to -.787) and the one on colonial link falls by nearly two-thirds 
(from 0.90 to 0.38). With respect to our variable of interest, the existence of a 
visa requirement reduces the bilateral flows of visitors by 46 percent. 
The third column of Table 2 presents our preferred specification. When the 
estimation controls for country pair fixed effects, a key ingredient in our analysis, 
the estimate of visa restrictions dummy falls by nearly two-thirds (from 0.61 
to 0.23). The effect of visa restrictions is estimated at 20 percent, i.e. a much 
smaller impact than the one reported by Neumayer (2010) or our previous es-
timates. In the same line of argument, after controlling for dyad fixed effects, 
the positive impact of embassies on international travel flows is approximately 
8 percent, i.e. much smaller than the one found without controlling for dyad 
7 Since there is a unanimous trend towards the reduction of visa requirements, we are not 
to discuss the impact of increasing the number of visa requirements. In other words, we 
cannot test the hypothesis of a symmetric effect between a reduction and an increase in 
visa requirements.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Dependent variable
Method estimation
(1)
ln arrivals
OLS
(2)
ln arrivals
OLS
(3)
ln arrivals
OLS
(4)
arrivals
POISSON
(5)
arrivals
POISSON
Visa restriction odt
–0.789*** –0.612*** –0.232*** –0.635*** –0.365**
[0.0377] [0.0328] [0.0563] [0.0627] [0.163]
ln distance od
–1.441*** –0.787***   –0.703***  
[0.0270] [0.0289]   [0.0702]  
Contiguity od
1.075*** 0.775***   0.490***  
[0.0970] [0.0784]   [0.0987]  
Colonial link od
0.900*** 0.381***   0.0944  
[0.111] [0.0871]   [0.0884]  
Common language od
1.093*** 0.696***   0.290***  
[0.0431] [0.0388]   [0.0634]  
Same region od
0.208*** 0.243***   0.321***  
[0.0417] [0.0369]   [0.0754]  
Economic integration agreement odt
  0.122*** –0.041 0.100* 0.138
  [0.0370] [0.0373] [0.0563] [0.123]
Diplomatic relations odt
  0.452*** 0.0867** 0.0916 0.153
  [0.0304] [0.0414] [0.0625] [0.100]
ln bilateral trade odt
  0.134*** 0.0179* 0.203*** 0.252***
  [0.00698] [0.00915] [0.0514] [0.0689]
ln bilateral migration odt
  0.193*** 0.399*** 0.196*** 0.128***
  [0.00650] [0.0137] [0.0136] [0.0380]
           
country pair fixed effects
    yes   yes
         
Observations 17,259 16,268 16,268 16,268 16,268
R-squared 0.862 0.887 0.981 0.912 0.933
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *. ** and *** indicate significance at 10%. 5% and 
1%. All regressions include country-and-year effects and a constant.
fixed effects in this paper (column 2: 56 percent) or in Gil-Pareja et al. (2007) 
(table 1, column 4: 29 percent).
As robustness check we estimate equation (1) using a Poisson estimator 
with clustered standard errors (Santos Silva and Teneyro, 2006). The results are 
presented in columns 4 and 5 in Table 2. Results are very similar for our variable 
of interest: once we control for country pair fixed effects, the detrimental impact 
of visa restrictions is about 30 percent 8. Overall we can conclude that the lack 
8 As a final robustness check we also took first differences of equation (1). As suggested 
by Wooldridge (2002; page 285), in a two-period framework we can test whether the 
difference version of equation (1) satisfies the assumption of strict exogeneity E[∆u|∆X 
]=0 where ∆X is the vector of first differences of all time-variant explanatory variables. 
When we implemented the differenced version of equation (1) and perform a F-test for 
joint significance, in all the specifications we could not reject strict exogeneity.
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of control for country pair fixed effects introduces a severe upward bias in the 
impact of visa restrictions on international tourist (and travel) flows.
Next we analyze whether the effect of visa restrictions differs across groups 
of countries. To test for this, we have interacted the visa restrictions variable 
with various dummy variables for country groups. The results are displayed in 
Table 3. To start with, visa restrictions have a more damaging effect on bilateral 
arrivals to developing countries than to developed countries. Whereas such restric-
tions reduce bilateral tourist flows by approximately 20 percent to developing 
countries, the effect is statistically not significantly different from zero on flows 
to developed countries. The reason is more likely that traveling to developed 
countries on average is more beneficial for potential tourists than doing it to de-
veloping countries (cities, monuments, cultural supplies, entertainment, nightlife, 
business opportunities, etc.); as a consequence, the existence of visa restrictions 
does not constitute an impediment to travel to developed countries. Among the 
more advanced economies, we find that visa restrictions have statistically not 
significant impact to travel to any of the high-income countries located in East 
Asia and Pacific (Japan, Australia, New Zealand), North America (Canada and 
USA) and Western Europe. Among the developing countries, visa restrictions 
have the largest effect on flows to countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(-29 percent), followed by Middle East and Northern Africa (-23 percent), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (-21 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (-20 percent). 
The effect on travel to low or middle-income eastern Asia and the Pacific, and 
to South Asia is negative but statistically insignificant. Note that these areas 
enjoyed the highest level of economic growth in the decade under consider-
ation, which could make more profitable (on average) visiting those countries 
for business purposes for example (India, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia), also 
being important destinations for leisure tourism (Thailand, Nepal, Maldives). 
Again, if it was the case, it may explain the lower impact of visa restrictions on 
tourist arrivals with respect to the rest of less developed and emerging world.
Testing conversely for differential effects of visa restrictions on tourists 
coming from certain groups of countries, we find that such restrictions have the 
same effect on those coming from developed (-19 percent) and from developing 
countries (-20 percent). This result suggest that after controlling for unobserved 
time-invariant dyad factors, the level of income of the countries does not matter 
in order to overcome the hassle and economic costs of obtaining a visa for tour-
ists. Nevertheless, we have large heterogeneity in the impact of visa restrictions 
by geographic regions. Among developed countries, the most strongly affected 
tourists are those from Western Europe (-26 percent) and North America (-21 
percent), whereas flows from East Asia and the Pacific are not statistically af-
fected. Among the various regions of the developing world, visa restrictions have 
the strongest negative effect on international arrivals from Sub-Saharan Africa 
(-34 percent) and Eastern European and Central Asia (-21 percent). International 
tourists coming from low-income countries of Latin America, East Asia, South 
Asia and Northern Africa not appear to be statistically significantly affected.
As a whole, and apart from the referred differences among particular regions, 
the results showed in Table 3 strengthen the key message coming from the main 
estimation (Table 2): visa restrictions have a relevant impact on the number of 
tourist flows around the world, with potentially serious implications in terms 
of receipts and related economic activity.
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TABLE 3
IMPACT OF VISA RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL TOURIST FLOWS  
BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(1)
Tourists to 
(income 
group)
(2)
Tourists to 
(region 
group)
(3)
Tourists 
from
(income 
group)
(4)
Tourists 
from
(region 
group)
VISA * Dummy (origin or destination country group)
High income countries –0.0885    –0.238***  [0.0912]   [0.0777]  
East Asia and Pacific   –0.0829   –0.171  [0.169]   [0.133]
North America   0.187    –0.239**  [0.142]   [0.121]
Western Europe   –0.371   –0.304***  [0.279]   [0.0624]
Non-high  income countries –0.227***    –0.206***  [0.0728]   [0.0689]  
Eastern Europe and Central Asia   –0.347**    –0.245**  [0.140]   [0.114]
East Asia and Pacific   –0.111   –0.0401  [0.168]   [0.178]
Latin America and Caribbean   –0.242**   –0.228  [0.0972]   [0.152]
Middle East and Northern Africa   –0.262**   –0.108  [0.126]   [0.149]
South Asia   –0.0693   0.104  [0.161]   [0.232]
Sub-Saharan Africa    –0.226**    –0.420*  [0.116]   [0.221]
         
Economic integration agreement odt –0.0403 –0.0386 –0.0409 –0.0372[0.0499] [0.0499] [0.0499] [0.0500]
Diplomatic relations odt 0.0862** 0.0871** 0.0866** 0.0873**[0.0414] [0.0415] [0.0414] [0.0414]
ln bilateral trade odt 0.0176* 0.0174* 0.0178* 0.0179**[0.00913] [0.00917] [0.00915] [0.00913]
ln bilateral migration odt 0.0394*** 0.0391*** 0.0396*** 0.0389***[0.0137] [0.0138] [0.0137] [0.0138]
         
country pair fixed effects yes yes yes yes
         
Number of observations 16,292 16,292 16,292 16,292
R squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%. All regressions include country-and-year effects and a constant.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that visa restrictions have a remarkable impact 
in the flows of international travelers. However, this effect is much lower (slightly 
over 20%) than suggested in previous estimations. The main reason for that 
difference lies in our controlling for country pair fixed effects to overcome an 
estimation limitation common in the literature on this topic (i.e. lack of control 
for unobservable heterogeneity across pairs of countries). But, even taking into 
account this caution, relevant costs in terms of economic activity could still arise 
from tourist visa restrictions. 
Additionally, when analyzing the origin of travelers, we find evidence of a 
negative and quantitatively similar impact of visa restrictions on people coming 
from developed and from developing and emerging countries. On the other hand, 
when studying the destination of international travelers, the detrimental impact 
of this type of restriction appears to be really significant for visitors to non-high 
income countries, with the exception of East and South Asia. On the contrary, no 
relevant effect is detected with respect to travelers going to rich countries. It could 
be suggested that economic areas with a higher level (developed countries) or a 
higher growth (East and South Asia) of economic activity maintain the flow of visi-
tors even when visa restrictions exist, since there are larger business opportunities. 
The current growing concern about terrorism and national security, particularly 
intense among developed countries, is providing a basis for an increase in entry 
requirements, in terms of both the number and the severity of these barriers, 
including visa restrictions (US Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010). This 
process, which is working even for pairs of countries not particularly associ-
ated with the origin or the main focus of international terrorism, runs against 
a clear and global –even if slow– path towards the reduction in the number of 
visa requirements during the last decades. 
In this context, the noteworthy difference among regions we find in this paper 
may support the idea that the new set of visa –and other types of– restrictions 
settled out by the most developed countries as a result of national security con-
cerns could cause a limited damage in terms of decreasing economic activity. 
However, if the general trend (towards less visa restrictions) turned around and 
the number of these kinds of limitations grew worldwide, it could be particularly 
negative for most of less developed and emerging countries.
Acknowledgments
Prof. Andres Artal-Tur thanks financial help by Groups of Excellence of the 
Region of Murcia, Fundación Séneca, Science and Technology Agency, Project 
19884/GERM/15 and  FEMISE Research Network, Projects FEM 41-13 and 
FEM 41-04.
References
Baier S. L., and Bergstrand, J. H. (2007). “Do free trade agreements actua-
lly increase members’ international trade?”. Journal of International 
Economics, 71, 72-95.
Examining the impact… / A. Artal-Tur, V. J. Pallardó-López, F. Requena-Silvente 277
Baltagi, B. H., Egger, P., and Pfaffermayr, M. (2003). “A generalized design for 
bilateral trade from models”. Economic Letters, 80(3), 391-397.
Bertoli, S., & Fernández-Huertas, J. (2012). Visa Policies, Networks and the Cliff 
at the Border. mimeo, http://www.fedea.es/ 033_Publicaciones_VerMas.
asp?id=960.
Chen, I-H., and Wall, H. J. (2005). “Controlling for heterogeneity in gravity 
models of trade and integration”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, 87(1), 49-63.
Eliat, Y., and Einav, L. (2004). “The determinants of international tourism: A three 
dimensional panel data analysis”. Applied Economics, 36, 1315-1328.
Gil-Pareja, S. Llorca-Vivero, R., and Martínez-Serrano, J. A. (2007). “The 
impact of embassies and consulates on tourism”. Tourism Management, 
28 (2), 355-360.
Head, K., Mayer, T., and Ries J. (2010). “The erosion of colonial trade linkages 
after independence”. Journal of International Economics, 81(1), 1-14.
IRTS (2008). International Recommendations for Tourism Statistics 2008 (IRTS 
2008). Madrid: United Nations World Tourism Organization.
Neumayer, E. (2006). “Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa 
restrictions to regulate mobility in a globalized world”. Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, 31(1), 72-84.
Neumayer, E. (2010). “Visa Restrictions and Bilateral Travel”. The Professional 
Geographer, 62(2), 171-181.
Neumayer, E. (2011). “On the detrimental impact of visa restrictions on bilateral 
trade and foreign direct investment”. Applied Geography, 31(3), 901-907.
Ozden, C., C. R. Parsons, M. Schiff, and T. L. Walmsley (2011). “Where on 
Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration 1960-
2000”. The World Bank Economic Review, 25(1), 12-56.
Patrick Rhamey, P. Cline, K. Bodung, S., and Henshaw A. (2010). The Diplomatic 
Contacts Data Base. Tucson: School of Government and Public Policy, 
University of Arizona (Version 1.1).
Santos Silva, J. M. C., and Teneyro, S. (2006). “The log of gravity”. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 641-658.
Song H., Gartnerb W. C., and Tascic A. (2012). “Visa restrictions and their 
adverse economic and marketing implications-Evidence from China”. 
Tourism Management, 33(2), 397-412.
Thomas, N. (2012). UK visa system attacked as tourists stay away during Olympics. 
The Telegraph, 11 October 2012, downloaded 26th December 2012.
US Office of Immigration Statistics (2010). “The 9/11 Terrorist Attack and 
Overseas Travel to the United States: Initial Impacts and Longer-Run 
Recovery”. US Department of Homeland Security WP, March.
World Bank (2012). World development indicators on-line. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.
UK Visa Bureau website: http://www.visabureau.com/uk/news/12-10-2012/uk-
visa-rate-drop-during-olympics-turns-up-pressure-on-government.aspx
UNWTO (2012). Statistical information on CD-ROM. Madrid: United Nations 
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
Zhang, J., and Jensen, C. (2007). “Comparative advantage explaining tourism 
flows”. Annals of Tourism Research, 34(1), 223-243.
Estudios de Economía, Vol. 43 - Nº 2278
Appendix
TABLE A.1
DATA DESCRIPTIVES
Data for year 2000 Number Mean s.d. min max
ln arrivals 9010 6,86 3,44 0 17,89
visa restriction 8643 0,55 0,50 0 1
ln distance 8984 8,48 0,94 4,29 9,89
contiguity 9010 0,04 0,20 0 1
colonial link 9010 0,02 0,15 0 1
common language 9010 0,20 0,40 0 1
same region 9010 0,36 0,48 0 1
regional economic agreement 1995 9010 0,14 0,34 0 1
diplomatic relations  1995 8461 0,44 0,50 0 1
ln bilateral trade 1995 8726 9,31 4,22 0 19,74
ln bilateral migration 1990 8881 5,21 3,48 0 16,10
           
Data for year 2010 Number Mean s.d. min max
ln arrivals 9010 7,53 3,09 0,69 18,19
visa restriction dummy 8648 0,48 0,50 0 1
ln distance 8984 8,79 0,94 4,29 9,89
contiguity 9010 0,04 0,20 0 1
colonial link 9010 0,20 0,40 0 1
common language 9010 0,02 0,15 0 1
same region 9010 0,36 0,48 0 1
regional economic agreement 2005 9010 0,14 0,35 0 1
diplomatic relations 2005 8461 0,50 0,50 0 1
ln bilateral trade 2005 8726 10,24 4,51 0 19,97
ln bilateral migration 2000 8881 5,69 3,47 0 16,09
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